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“Game theory has a great advantage in explicitly analyzing the con-
sequences of trading rules that presumably are really common knowl-
edge; it is deficient to the extent it assumes other features to be common
knowledge, such as one player’s probability assessment about another’s
preferences or information.
I foresee the progress of game theory as depending on successive re-
ductions in the base of common knowledge required to conduct useful
analysis of practical problems. Only by repeated weakening of common
knowledge assumptions will the theory approximate reality.”
Robert Wilson (1987)
1 Introduction
The correct design of institutions can be decisive for achieving desirable economic
goals. Typically, achieving such a correct design depends on the knowledge of key
parameters in the environment, most of which are often unknown by the economic
authority. The theory of implementation or mechanism design looks in a systematic
way at the design of rules for social interaction that do not assume detailed knowledge
of the fundamentals by those with power to impose social outcomes. In attempting
to bring further realism to the theory, one can assume that not only the economic
authority (or mechanism designer, or planner) does not know those parameters, but
the same holds true for the agents in the system, who may, for example, not know the
true preferences of others. These are called incomplete information environments.
In such environments, an agent’s private information is summarized by the notion
of a type. For an agent, a type specifies (i) his private information about his own
preferences and/or the preferences of others (payoff type), (ii) his belief about the
payoff types of others (first-order belief ), (iii) his belief about others’ first-order
beliefs (second-order belief ), and so on, leading to a hierarchy of beliefs ad infinitum.
A basic assumption of the classic approach to mechanism design under incomplete
information is that the underlying spaces of types are common knowledge among
the planner and the agents. In making this assumption, as is often the case in the
literature, one effectively assumes that each first-order belief corresponds to a unique
infinite hierarchy of beliefs. Hence, the designer does not need to consider higher-
order beliefs in the analysis.1 This common-knowledge assumption is often seen as
unrealistic, and, as the opening quote from Wilson suggests, the theory should be
revised with more attention given to this issue. Carrying out such a research program
1For instance, to be able to extract full surplus from the agents, Cremer and McLean (1988)
exploit the property that in a fixed finite type space with a generic common prior, the planner can
infer agents’ preferences by eliciting their first-order beliefs. See Neeman (2004) and Heifetz and
Neeman (2006) for further details.
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is said to be following the Wilson doctrine.
This paper proposes a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine. It provides a
different framework, rich enough to allow flexibility in higher-order beliefs, and within
that framework, it studies virtual (i.e, approximate) implementation. We start with
the assumption that the designer may have some information that allows her to
rule out certain first-order beliefs of the agents; this information may come through
previous experience or from some information acquisition process. We denote by ∆
such a restriction on first-order beliefs, and we assume it to be common knowledge.2
To make our analysis robust to the specification of higher-order beliefs, we use
a type-free solution concept of rationalizability – ∆-rationalizability (Battigalli and
Siniscalchi (2003))– that guarantees that the predictions are the same for any higher-
order beliefs, as long as those predictions are consistent with our ∆ restriction on
the first-order belief set.
Suppose the planner wishes to (approximately) implement a particular set of
socially optimal outcomes, summarized by a social choice function (SCF). We derive
both necessary and sufficient conditions for robust virtual implementation (RVI) of
SCFs in ∆-rationalizable strategies. The conditions consist of a version of incentive
compatibility, which we call ∆-incentive compatibility, and an additional condition,
which we call ∆-measurability.
Furthermore, we show that every SCF satisfies ∆-measurability as long as the
∆-restriction rules out a particular zero-measure set of first-order beliefs; the set
includes all the beliefs where two different payoff types have identical interim pref-
erences. Thus, generically, the appropriate version of incentive compatibility is the
only condition restricting RVI of SCFs.
This result ought to be contrasted with another result obtained for RVI for the
case of no restrictions on first-order beliefs (∆ = ∅).3 Then, our characterization re-
duces to the one obtained by Bergemann and Morris (2009) (we use the initials B&M
to refer to these authors from now on), who conclude that virtual implementation is
severely restricted beyond their version of incentive compatibility. B&M (2009) ar-
gue that, for an important class of preferences, the conditions for RVI are equivalent
to the conditions for robust exact implementation, which are commonly assessed as
restrictive. Our analysis shows that this conclusion hinges on a zero-measure set,
and hence, that the usual distinction between the exact and virtual implementation
approaches remains, even in the robust setting, when such a set is removed.
We provide further detail in the rest of the introduction. We begin by review-
ing different notions of implementation in order to frame our contribution more
precisely. We then explain the extra restrictions on beliefs brought about by the
2We use ∆ to designate our restriction following a convention in the literature, but this is not to
be confused with a probability simplex, for which we also use the symbol ∆. No confusion should
arise in context. Note also that the case ∆ = ∅ (i.e., no restriction at all) is covered.
3See the recent book on robust mechanism design by Bergemann and Morris (2012) which
surveys this literature, and also collects all their papers on the topic. See also the papers cited in
its introduction and a related paper by Saijo, Sjo¨stro¨m, and Yamato (2007, Section 5).
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planner’s additional information and describe necessary and sufficient conditions for
implementation in our sense.
1.1 Notions of Implementation
The current paper studies full, virtual, and robust implementation of SCFs.4 Full
implementation is the requirement that the set of outcomes prescribed by a given
solution concept coincide with the SCF. One considers full implementation after en-
suring that partial implementation – which allows other outcomes that are solutions
to a game but not socially optimal – is possible. Virtual implementation means
that the planner contents herself with implementing the SCF with arbitrarily high
probability. This is an approximate version of exact implementation, which insists
on implementing the SCF with probability 1. Finally, robust implementation is the
requirement that implementation survive any specification of higher-order beliefs
consistent with the common knowledge structure of the environment (i.e., consistent
with the ∆-restriction). In contrast, what we shall call the classic approach to imple-
mentation assumes that the entire type space is common knowledge; this approach
thus pins down the higher-order beliefs uniquely, a significantly stronger assumption.
When one requires robust implementation, one should expect the conditions on
SCFs to become stronger than in the classic approach. Indeed, for exact implemen-
tation, the robust analysis is known to turn conditions that are already somewhat
restrictive into much stronger ones.5
In view of the strength of the conditions required for robust exact implementa-
tion, one might prefer to consider its approximate version: virtual implementation
(Matsushima (1988), Abreu and Sen (1991)). For classic environments where the
type spaces are common knowledge, Abreu and Matsushima (1992a, b) (henceforth,
we use A&M to refer to these authors) characterize virtual implementation in itera-
tive elimination of strictly dominated strategies. This solution concept places weak
requirements on agents’ rationality and is closely related to rationalizability, which
we use. A&M (1992b) find that incentive compatibility and a measurability con-
dition, which we shall refer to as A&M measurability, are necessary conditions. In
quasi-transferable environments, which allow small utility transfers among agents,
both are also shown to be sufficient.
Incentive compatibility is clearly unavoidable in full implementation, since it is
4For surveys on implementation, see, for example, Palfrey and Srivastava (1993), Jackson (2001),
and Serrano (2004).
5In the environments where ∆ = ∅, the robust analogues of conditions for exact implementation
are ex-post incentive compatibility and robust monotonicity. For appraisals of these conditions,
see, e.g., Jehiel et al. (2006) and B&M(2011), respectively. Jehiel et al. (2006) show that in some
settings ex post incentive compatibility would generically require a social choice function (SCF) to
be constant. In others, it still leaves room for nontrivial SCFs (see our Subsection 4.1, or B&M
(2009, Section 3)). Robust monotonicity amounts to requiring Bayesian monotonicity – a necessary
condition in the classic approach – in every type space, which is a very restrictive condition (B&M,
2011).
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necessary even for partial implementation. Hence, if one considers full implementa-
tion, as we do, one should focus on the measurability condition. A&M measurability
stipulates that the SCF must be constant on each element of the suitably defined,
finest possible partition of the payoff-type space, which corresponds to the maximum
possible separation of payoff types according to their interim preferences.6 In a classic
Bayesian environment, A&M measurability is usually perceived as very permissive,
and even close to trivial. Hence, in such classic settings, the limitations of virtual
implementation essentially amount to the incentive compatibility constraint.
Yet the role that fixed finite type spaces play in the constructions presented in
A&M (1992b) has not been fully understood; one conjecture (B&M (2009, p. 49)) is
that this role is crucial, as it is for a number of other results in the literature. Indeed,
in the robust analysis when ∆ = ∅, B&M (2009) characterize RVI by means of ex
post incentive compatibility and robust measurability, and they assess the latter to
be an extremely restrictive condition. To show the restrictiveness of their version of
measurability, B&M (2009) construct a very specific type space in which the interim
preferences of all types must be aligned. In such a type space, payoff types cannot be
separated.7 In contrast, the arbitrary ∆-restriction, which is the crux of the current
paper, suggests a way to evaluate the limitations of RVI. By using this ∆-restriction,
our analysis both complements the one in B&M (2009) by assessing the restrictiveness
of measurability-like conditions, and challenges some of its conclusions.
1.2 The ∆-restriction on First-order Beliefs
To be specific, the ∆-restriction assumes that for each agent i there is a prespecified
set Qi of allowed first-order beliefs. (When Qi is the entire unrestricted simplex, our
analysis reduces to the case considered by B&M (2009).) Consistent with this re-
striction, the solution concept of ∆-rationalizability simply imposes the requirement
that first-order beliefs lie in the sets Qi on top of standard rationalizability.simply
imposes the requirement that first-order beliefs lie in the sets Qi.
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We proceed as follows. We fix a (typically rich) space of first-order types, which
are the combinations of payoff types and first-order beliefs. We assume this space
to be common knowledge among the agents. Then, we require that implementation
in ∆-rationalizable strategies obtain for all higher-order beliefs coherent with our
original first-order type space.
6To find such a partition, one constructs an iterative algorithm that gradually refines the payoff-
type space; see A&M (1992b) and our Subsection 3.2 for details.
7Serrano and Vohra (2001) earlier observed that virtual Bayesian implementation may fail in
a classic Bayesian environment for exactly that reason, but they argued later (Serrano and Vohra
(2005)) that such failures are arguably “rare.”
8Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003) show that ∆-rationalizability coincides with Bayesian equi-
libria in all coherent type spaces and Battigalli et al. (2011) show that (a suitably defined) ∆-
rationalizability is equivalent to the interim correlated rationalizability of Dekel, Fudenberg, and
Morris (2007).
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1.3 Necessary Conditions
To begin with, RVI in ∆-rationalizable strategies is limited by the (interim) incentive
compatibility imposed on the first-order types present in the model. We refer to such
a condition as ∆-incentive compatibility, and Theorem 1 shows it to be necessary for
RVI in ∆-rationalizable strategies. In Theorem 2 we then show that a version of
A&M’s original measurability is also necessary for RVI in our sense. We propose ∆-
measurability, which we define as A&M measurability subject to the ∆-restriction.
Generalizing the approach in Serrano and Vohra (2005), we propose next a con-
dition that we term ∆-type diversity. In environments satisfying ∆-type diversity, all
payoff types can be separated from one another in the first round of the measurabil-
ity algorithm. This renders ∆-measurability a trivial condition. Importantly, almost
every environment in our settings satisfies the ∆-type diversity condition when there
are at least three alternatives.
1.4 Sufficient Conditions and Implementing Mechanisms
To construct implementing mechanisms, we first consider quasi-transferable environ-
ments satisfying ∆-type diversity, and we show (Theorem 3) that an SCF is robustly
virtually implementable as long as it satisfies ∆-incentive compatibility.9 Since ∆-
type diversity generically holds, it follows that in quasi-transferable environments,
one almost never needs to rely on any additional condition beyond the appropriate
version of incentive compatibility.
Next, we obtain a characterization without using the ∆-type diversity assump-
tion, and thereby extend the work of A&M (1992b) to our setting and solution
concept. The proof of Theorem 4 provides the sufficiency argument to show that
∆-incentive compatibility and ∆-measurability are necessary and sufficient for RVI
in ∆-rationalizable strategies. To further underscore the tight connection with A&M
(1992b), we follow A&M’s arguments closely in the construction of our mechanisms.
In summary, our results demonstrate that, even in the robust analysis, the limi-
tations of virtual implementation are almost always confined to the relevant notion
of incentive compatibility. The measurability condition drops out because it is gener-
ically satisfied by all SCFs. Even if a zero-measure set of first-order beliefs is ruled
out, ∆-incentive compatibility is as restrictive as ex-post incentive compatibility. For
measurability conditions, in contrast, ruling out certain zero-measure sets turns a re-
strictive condition into a trivial one. In an area plagued with very negative results,
and with the understanding that the incentive-compatibility requirements may in-
deed be quite limiting, our contribution clarifies the possibilities of RVI, and thus
offers a piece of good news to increase the permissiveness of the theory.
9To prove our sufficiency results (Theorems 3 and 4) we employ the assumption that Qi’s are
finite sets, but this is not essential. Indeed, as detailed after the statement of Theorem 4, one can
adapt the canonical “maximally revealing” mechanism in B&M (2009) to the specific Qi’s assumed.
The finiteness assumption makes the argument in Theorem 3 and its connections to mechanisms in
A&M (1992b) and in Theorem 4 especially transparent.
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1.5 Plan of the Paper
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we introduce the preliminary no-
tation and definitions. In Section 3 we present Theorems 1 and 2, showing that
∆-incentive compatibility and ∆-measurability are necessary conditions for RVI in ∆-
rationalizable strategies. Section 4 discusses the relationship between our approach
and the case in which the planner has no information about the set of first-order
beliefs, and presents our genericity arguments. Sufficiency results are presented in
Section 5. We conclude in Section 6. Appendix A contains the proof of genericity of
∆-type diversity for continuum settings. A discussion on the connection with virtual
implementation in Bayesian equilibrium, as well as all the omitted proofs and formal
details in the paper, can be found in the online appendix (Artemov, Kunimoto, and
Serrano (2012), not for publication in print).
2 Preliminaries
Let N = {1, . . . , n} denote the set of agents and Θi be the set of finite payoff types
of agent i. Denote Θ ≡ Θ1×· · ·×Θn, and Θ−i ≡ Θ1×· · ·×Θi−1×Θi+1×· · ·×Θn.10
Let qi(θ−i) denote agent i’s first-order belief that other agents receive the profile of
payoff types θ−i. For an abstract finite set X, we will denote the set of probability
distributions over X by ∆(X). Let Qi ⊆ ∆(Θ−i) be the set of allowed first-order
beliefs of agent i. We call Ti ≡ Θi ×Qi the set of first-order types of agent i.
Let A denote the set of pure outcomes, which is assumed to be independent of
the information state. Suppose A = {a1, . . . , aK} is finite.11
Agent i’s state dependent von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function is denoted
ui : ∆(A)×Θ→ R.
We can now define an environment as E = (A, {ui,Θi, Qi}i∈N), which is implic-
itly understood to be common knowledge among the agents. In particular, if Qi is
unrestricted for each i, that is, Qi = ∆(Θ−i), we call it a payoff environment denoted
as E∆ = (A, {ui,Θi}i∈N). This is the environment that B&M (2009, 2011) consider
when they explore the notion of robustness. Our approach adopts an intermediate
robustness criterion, as it allows Qi to be an arbitrary set of first-order beliefs. In
particular, as one can allow a rich set of payoff and first-order belief types, our model
escapes the criticism in Neeman (2004) of “beliefs-determine-preferences”, the prob-
lem we have alluded to in the opening paragraph of our paper. While Qi consists of
all possible beliefs that agents could potentially have in our model, no prior on that
set, common or not, needs to be assumed.
A social choice function (SCF) is a function f : Θ → ∆(A). Note that, as is
standard in the literature on robust implementation, the domain of the SCFs is the
10Similar notation will be used for products of other sets.
11If A were an arbitrary separable metric space, we would work with its countable dense subset.
The reader is referred to Section 6 of Abreu and Sen (1991) or to Duggan (1997) for more details.
See footnote 15 below, when this assumption is invoked.
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payoff type space.
Define Vi(f ; θ
′
i|θi, qi) to be the interim expected utility of agent i of first-order
type (θi, qi) that pretends to be of first-order type (θ
′
i, q
′
i) corresponding to an SCF
f as follows:12
Vi(f ; θ
′
i|θi, qi) =
∑
θ−i∈Θ−i
qi(θ−i)ui(f(θ′i, θ−i); θi, θ−i)
where (θi, qi), (θ
′
i, q
′
i) ∈ Ti = Θi ×Qi. Denote Vi(f |θi, qi) = Vi(f ; θi|θi, qi).
A mechanism Γ = ((Mi)i∈N , g) describes a (nonempty) finite message space Mi
for agent i and an outcome function g : M → ∆(A), where M = ×i∈NMi.
Next we define the solution concept of ∆-rationalizability that we use in the
paper.
We define a message correspondence profile S = (S1, . . . , Sn) where for each
i ∈ N ,
Si : Θi → 2Mi ,
and we write S for the collection of message correspondence profiles.13 The collection
S is a lattice with the natural ordering of set inclusion: S ⊆ S ′ if Si(θi) ⊆ S ′i(θi) for
all i ∈ N and θi ∈ Θi. The largest element is S¯ = (S¯1, . . . , S¯n), where S¯i(θi) = Mi for
all i ∈ N and θi ∈ Θi. The smallest element is S = (S1, . . . , Sn), where Si(θi) = ∅
for all i ∈ N and θi ∈ Θi.
We define an operator b = (b1, . . . , bn) to iteratively eliminate never best re-
sponses. To this end, we denote the belief of agent i over message and payoff type
profiles of the remaining agents by µi ∈ ∆(Θ−i ×M−i). Most importantly, we intro-
duce some restrictions on agents’ first-order beliefs. For any qi ∈ Qi, define
∆qi(Θ−i ×M−i) ≡ {µi ∈ ∆(Θ−i ×M−i)| margΘ−iµi = qi},
where margΘ−iµi(θ−i) ≡
∑
m−i µi(θ−i,m−i) for each θ−i ∈ Θ−i. The operator b :S → S is now defined as follows:
bi(S)[θi] ≡
mi ∈Mi
∣∣∣∣∣
∃qi ∈ Qi ∃µi ∈ ∆qi(Θ−i ×M−i) s.t.
µi(θ−i,m−i) > 0⇒ mj ∈ Sj(θj) ∀j 6= i; and
mi ∈ arg maxm′i∈Mi
∑
θ−i,m−i µi(θ−i,m−i)ui(g(m
′
i,m−i); θi, θ−i)

This is an incomplete information version of rationalizability, proposed by Bat-
tigalli and Siniscalchi (2003). They call it ∆-rationalizability and denote by ∆ re-
strictions on the set of first-order beliefs. When Qi = ∆(Θ−i), this rationalizability
is equivalent to the one used by B&M (2009). We observe that b is increasing by
12Note how, since the SCF does not depend on first-order beliefs, the misrepresentation of qi into
q′i is of no consequence.
13To avoid heavy notation, we ignore the fact that the message correspondence depends on the
underlying mechanism Γ.
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definition: S ≤ S ′ ⇒ b(S) ≤ b(S ′). By Tarski’s fixed point theorem, there is a
largest fixed point of b, which we label SΓ. Thus, we have that (i) b(SΓ) = SΓ and
(ii) b(S) = S ⇒ S ≤ SΓ. Since the message space is finite, we have
SΓi (θi) ≡
⋂
n≥1
bi(b
n(S¯))[θi].
Thus SΓi (θi) are the set of messages surviving iterated deletion of never best re-
sponses; equivalently, SΓi (θi) is the set of messages that player i with payoff type
θi might send consistent with common certainty of rationality, but with some re-
strictions on the first-order beliefs. Note that, since the message space M is finite,
SΓi (θi) 6= ∅; it is also unique. We refer to SΓi (θi) as the ∆-rationalizable messages of
payoff type θi of agent i in mechanism Γ.
Write ‖y − y′‖ for the rectilinear norm between a pair of lotteries y and y′, i.e.,
‖y − y′‖ ≡
∑
a∈A
|y(a)− y′(a)|.
Definition 1 (Robust Virtual Implementation in ∆-Rationalizable Strategies)
An SCF f is robustly virtually implementable if there exists ε¯ > 0 such that,
for any ε ∈ (0, ε¯], there exists a mechanism Γε = (M ε, gε) for which for any θ ∈ Θ
and m ∈M ε,
SΓ
ε
(θ) 6= ∅ and m ∈ SΓε(θ)⇒ ‖gε(m)− f(θ)‖ ≤ ε.
Note that when ε is taken to be 0 in the above definition, the corresponding
concept would be robust exact implementation.
3 Necessity for Robust Virtual Implementation
In this section we discuss the necessary conditions for RVI when the environment
specifies an arbitrary set Qi of first-order beliefs for each agent i. These conditions are
necessary independently of the more specific assumptions made on the environment.14
3.1 Incentive Compatibility
The notion of first-order type suggests the following definition, which is the standard
interim incentive compatibility condition applied to the first-order types present in
the model, as specified by the sets Qi:
14In a standard Bayesian environment with a fixed type space, Kunimoto and Serrano (2011) iden-
tify another necessary condition if one uses finite or regular mechanisms, which a fortiori also applies
to our robust settings. This condition is vacuously satisfied in the presence of quasi-transferability
(to be defined in Section 5), and hence, given our results later in the current paper, there is no need
to state it here.
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Definition 2 (∆-incentive compatibility) An SCF f : Θ → ∆(A) satisfies ∆-
incentive compatibility if, for any i ∈ N any (θi, qi) ∈ Ti = Θi × Qi and any
θ
′
i ∈ Θi,
Vi(f |θi, qi) ≥ Vi(f ; θ′i|θi, qi)
We shall say that an SCF f satisfies strict ∆-incentive compatibility if all the
inequalities in the preceding definition are strict whenever θi 6= θ′i.
For a fixed mechanism Γ = (M, g), we define agent i’s (pure) strategy σi : Θi →
Mi. The next theorem identifies ∆-incentive compatibility as a necessary condition
for implementability:
Theorem 1 If an SCF f is robustly virtually implementable, then it satisfies ∆-
incentive compatibility.
Proof : By our hypothesis, for each ε > 0 sufficiently small, there exists a corre-
sponding mechanism Γ such that for all θ ∈ Θ, m ∈ SΓ(θ)⇒ ‖g(m)− f(θ)‖ ≤ ε.
Fix σ−i : Θ−i → M−i such that σ−i(θ−i) ∈ SΓ−i(θ−i) for each θ−i ∈ Θ−i. For any
m′i ∈ SΓi (θ′i), RVI requires that for any θ−i ∈ Θ−i,
‖g(m′i, σ−i(θ−i))− f(θ′i, θ−i)‖ ≤ ε. (1)
Suppose that agent i is of first-order type (θi, qi) and he holds the belief µi ∈
∆qi(Θ−i × M−i) such that for each θ−i with qi(θ−i) > 0 and each m−i ∈ M−i,
µi(θ−i,m−i) > 0 if and only if m−i = σ−i(θ−i). Let mi be any message that is a best
response to the belief µi. Then if mi ∈ SΓi (θi), RVI implies that for any θ−i ∈ Θ−i,
‖g(mi, σ−i(θ−i))− f(θi, θ−i)‖ ≤ ε. (2)
By the best response property of mi and the construction of µi,∑
θ−i,m−i
µi(θ−i,m−i) [ui(g(mi,m−i); θi, θ−i)− ui(g(m′i,m−i); θi, θ−i)] ≥ 0.
Once again, by the construction of µi, we can rewrite the above inequality as follows:∑
θ−i
qi(θ−i) [ui(g(mi, σ−i(θ−i)); θi, θ−i)− ui(g(m′i, σ−i(θ−i)); θi, θ−i)] ≥ 0. (3)
Due to the fact that Θ and A are finite, (1),(2), and (3) together imply the following:
there exists C > 0 such that∑
θ−i
qi(θ−i) [ui(f(θi, θ−i); θi, θ−i)− ui(f(θ′i, θ−i); θi, θ−i)] ≥ −εC.
Since ε can be chosen arbitrarily small due to the requirement of RVI, we obtain∑
θ−i
qi(θ−i) [ui(f(θi, θ−i); θi, θ−i)− ui(f(θ′i, θ−i); θi, θ−i)] ≥ 0.
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This can be written as:
Vi(f |θi, qi) ≥ Vi(f ; θ′i|θi, qi).
This establishes that f satisfies ∆-incentive compatibility. 
When Qi = ∆(Θ−i) for every i ∈ N , it is easy to see that ∆-incentive compati-
bility is equivalent to ex post incentive compatibility :
Definition 3 (Ex Post Incentive Compatibility) An SCF f : Θ→ ∆(A) satis-
fies ex post incentive compatibility if for any i ∈ N, θ−i ∈ Θ−i, and θi, θ′i ∈ Θi,
ui(f(θi, θ−i); θi, θ−i) ≥ ui(f(θ′i, θ−i); θi, θ−i).
3.2 Measurability
In an important paper, A&M (1992b) have uncovered a condition that they have
termed measurability (we shall refer to it as A&M measurability) that is necessary
for virtual implementation in iteratively undominated strategies over a standard
environment that fixes a Bayesian type space. In this section we revisit the A&M
measurability condition by adapting it to our RVI analysis.
Denote by Ψi a partition of the set of first-order types Ti, where ψi is a generic
element of Ψi and Ψi(ti) denotes the element of Ψi that includes first-order type
ti = (θi, qi). Let Ψ = ×i∈NΨi and ψ = ×i∈Nψi.
Definition 4 An SCF f is measurable with respect to Ψ if, for every i ∈ N
and every ti = (θi, qi), t
′
i = (θ
′
i, q
′
i) ∈ Ti with θi 6= θ′i, whenever Ψi(ti) = Ψi(t′i),
f(θi, θ−i) = f(θ′i, θ−i) ∀θ−i ∈ Θ−i.
Measurability of f with respect to Ψ implies that for any agent i, f does not
distinguish between any pair of payoff types that lie in the same cell of the partition
Ψi.
Definition 5 Fix a mechanism Γ = (M, g). A strategy σi : Θi → Mi for player i
is measurable with respect to Ψi if for every ti = (θi, qi), t
′
i = (θ
′
i, q
′
i) ∈ Ti with
θi 6= θ′i,
Ψi(ti) = Ψi(t
′
i) =⇒ σi(θi) = σi(θ′i).
A strategy profile σ is measurable with respect to Ψ if, for every i ∈ N , σi is
measurable with respect to Ψi.
We can now provide the definition of equivalent (first-order) types. Note that,
since agent i ∈ N distinguishes all its first-order types, we consider a partition
Ti × Ψ−i ≡ {{ti}ti∈Ti} × Ψ−i in that definition, unlike the definition of measurable
strategies.
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Definition 6 For every i ∈ N, ti = (θi, qi), t′i = (θ′i, q′i) ∈ Ti with θi 6= θ′i, and (n−1)
tuple of partitions Ψ−i, we say that ti is equivalent to t′i (denoted by ti ∼ t′i) with
respect to Ψ−i if, for any pair of SCFs f and f˜ which are measurable with respect to
Ti ×Ψ−i,
Vi(f |ti) ≥ Vi(f˜ |ti)⇐⇒ Vi(f |t′i) ≥ Vi(f˜ |t′i).
Remark: What we aim to distinguish are “payoff types.” In particular, we consider
two first-order types (θi, qi) and (θ
′
i, q
′
i) as equivalent if θi = θ
′
i.
Let ρi(ti,Ψ−i) be the set of all elements of Ti that are equivalent to ti with respect
to Ψ−i, and let
Ri(Ψ−i) = {ρi(ti,Ψ−i) ⊆ Ti| ti ∈ Ti} .
Note that Ri(Ψ−i) forms an equivalence class on Ti, that is, it constitutes a
partition of Ti. We define an infinite sequence of n-tuples of partitions, {Ψh}∞h=0,
where Ψh = ×i∈NΨhi in the following way. For every i ∈ N ,
Ψ0i = {Ti},
and recursively, for every i ∈ N and every h ≥ 1,
Ψhi = Ri(Ψ
h−1
−i ).
Note that for every h ≥ 0, Ψh+1i is the same as, or finer than, Ψhi . Thus, we have a
partial order ≥ as Ψh+1i ≥ Ψhi . Define Ψ∗ as follows:
Ψ∗ ≡
∞∨
h=0
Ψh,
where
∨
denotes the join on {Ψh}∞h=0 associated with ≥.
Since Θi is finite for each agent i ∈ N , there exists a positive integer L such that
Ψh = ΨL for any h ≥ L. We can write Ψ∗ = ΨL.
Definition 7 An SCF f satisfies ∆-measurability if it is measurable with respect
to Ψ∗.
Note how the partitions Ψ0, Ψ1, ..., and hence, the final partition Ψ∗ used in
∆-measurability are simply derived as a property of the environment. The aim is
to “treat equally” those first-order types that are “indistinguishable” according to
their interim preferences. Thus, we start considering constant SCFs, i.e., SCFs that
are measurable with respect to the coarsest possible partition, and we separate first-
order types who have different payoff types and different interim preferences over
this class of SCFs. This gives us a new partition of the set of first-order types for
each agent (iteration 1). Next, we consider SCFs measurable with respect to these
new partitions, and ask the same question: are there first-order types that, having
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the same preferences over constant SCFs, now can be separated because, having dif-
ferent payoff types, they exhibit different interim preferences over the enlarged class
of SCFs considered? If the answer is No, the process ends and we have found Ψ∗.
If it is Yes, we proceed to make the induced finer partition of each set of first-order
types (iteration 2), and so on. The process ends with the identification of Ψ∗, which
provides the maximum possible degree of first-order type separation or distinguisha-
bility in terms of interim preferences. ∆-measurability simply asks that the SCF not
distinguish between different first-order types that are “indistinguishable” according
to Ψ∗.
∆-measurability, when applied over the unrestricted set of first-order beliefs,
yields robust measurability, a condition introduced by B&M (2009), who also note
that relation. Robust measurability implies ∆-measurability, but the examples in
the next section show that they are distinct conditions. The connections between
the two conditions are detailed in the online appendix.
It should be apparent that ∆-measurability is akin to A&M measurability subject
to the ∆ restriction on first-order types, but in the end is concerned with the separa-
tion of payoff types. A&M (1992b) show that in a Bayesian environment with a fixed
type space, A&M measurability is a necessary condition for virtual implementation
in iteratively undominated strategies. We establish a robust analogue of this result:
Theorem 2 If an SCF f is robustly virtually implementable, then it satisfies ∆-
measurability.
Proof : Since f is robustly virtually implementable, there exists a mechanism
Γ = (M, g) such that whenever m ∈ SΓ(θ), ‖g(m)− f(θ)‖ ≤ ε for ε > 0. Recall that
σi : Θi →Mi is defined as agent i’s pure strategy. For each h ≥ 1, let Kh = ×i∈NKhi
be the sets of strategies that survive h rounds of iterative elimination of never best
responses.
Consider an arbitrary constant strategy profile σ[0] ∈ K0 which is measurable
with respect to ×i∈N{Ti}. Then, either (1) ‖g(σ[0](θ))− f(θ)‖ ≤ ε for every θ or (2)
‖g(σ[0](θ))− f(θ)‖ > ε for some θ ∈ Θ.
In case (1), because ε can be chosen arbitrarily, f is a constant SCF. It is then
measurable with respect to ×i∈N{Ti}, hence with respect to Ψ∗ as well. Thus, f
satisfies ∆-measurability and we complete the proof.
In case (2), by the definition of Ψ1 and our hypothesis that f is robustly virtually
implementable, it follows that for every i ∈ N , there exists σi[1] ∈ Ki that is a best
response to σ−i[0] and is measurable with respect to Ψ1i . Hence, σi[1] ∈ K1i .
There are again two possibilities: suppose ‖g(σ[1](θ))−f(θ)‖ ≤ ε for every θ ∈ Θ.
Then g◦σ[1] is measurable with respect to Ψ1. Consider ti = (θi, qi), t′i = (θ′i, q′i) ∈ Ti
such that θi 6= θ′i and Ψ1i (ti) = Ψ1i (t′i). Note that Ψ1i (ti) is the element of Ψ1i that
includes ti. By the previous hypothesis, we have that for any θ−i, ‖g(σ[1](θi, θ−i)−
f(θi, θ−i)‖ ≤ ε and ‖g(σ[1](θ′i, θ−i)−f(θi, θ−i)‖ ≤ ε. Since σ[1](θi, θ−i) = σ[1](θ′i, θ−i)
for θ−i by measurability with respect to Ψ1, we have ‖f(θi, θ−i) − f(θ′i, θ−i)‖ ≤
2ε. Since this must be true for any ε > 0, we obtain f(θi, θ−i) = f(θ′i, θ−i) for
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any θ−i. Hence, f satisfies ∆-measurability. Suppose, on the other hand, that
‖g(σ[1](θ)) − f(θ)‖ > ε for some θ ∈ Θ, in which case at least one type finds his
strategy σi[1] as never a best response given K1. We then repeat the argument to
arrive at either ∆-measurability of f or at a conclusion that some strategy is never
a best response given K2.
Take an arbitrary h = 2, 3, . . ., and suppose that there exists a strategy profile
σ[h − 1] ∈ Kh−1 that is measurable with respect to Ψh−1. Again, there are two
possibilities: if ‖g(σ[h− 1](θ))− f(θ)‖ ≤ ε for every θ ∈ Θ, by the argument in the
previous paragraph, we can show that f satisfies ∆-measurability. Otherwise, since
f is robustly virtually implementable by our hypothesis, for every i ∈ N , there exists
σi[h] ∈ Ki that is a best response to σ−i[h−1] and is measurable with respect to Ψhi .
Let σ∗ be a strategy profile that survives the iterative elimination of never best
responses in the implementing mechanism Γ. Then, the preceding argument implies
that σ∗ is measurable with respect to Ψ∗. It follows that g ◦ σ∗ is measurable with
respect to Ψ∗. By our hypothesis that f is robustly virtually implementable, we have
‖g(σ∗(θ))−f(θ)‖ ≤ ε for any θ ∈ Θ. Consider ti = (θi, qi), t′i = (θ′i, q′i) ∈ Ti such that
θi 6= θ′i and Ψ∗i (ti) = Ψ∗i (t′i). Once again, by our hypothesis that f is robustly virtually
implementable, we can show that ‖f(θi, θ−i) − f(θ′i, θ−i)‖ ≤ 2ε for any θ−i ∈ Θ−i.
Since this must be true for any ε > 0, it follows that f(θi, θ−i) = f(θ′i, θ−i) for any
θ−i. Thus, f satisfies ∆-measurability.
To illustrate the implications of ∆-measurability, we shall introduce a weak reg-
ularity assumption on environments. To do so, we need some notation. Recall that
A = {a1, . . . , aK}. Define V ki (ti) to be the interim expected utility of agent i of
first-order type ti = (θi, qi) for the constant SCF that assigns ak in each state in Θ,
i.e.,
V ki (ti) =
∑
θ−i∈Θ−i
qi(θ−i)ui(ak; θi, θ−i).
Let Vi(ti) = (V
1
i (ti), . . . , V
K
i (ti)).
Next, we define the condition of ∆-type diversity in an environment, which will
play an important role in our analysis:
Definition 8 (∆-TD) An environment E satisfies ∆-type diversity (∆-TD) if
there do not exist i ∈ N, ti = (θi, qi), t′i = (θ′i, q′i) ∈ Ti with θi 6= θ′i, β ∈ R++ and
γ ∈ R such that
Vi(ti) = βVi(t
′
i) + γe,
where e is the unit vector in RK.15
15 If A is a separable metric space, let A∗ = {a1, a2, . . .} be a countable dense subset of A. Now,
we can define
Vi(ti) = (V
k
i (ti))
∞
k=1 ∈ R∞
We also define e as the countable unit base in A with ‖e‖ = 1. With these qualifications, ∆-TD is
also well defined for separable metric spaces.
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∆-type diversity is an extension of the type diversity condition for a standard
Bayesian environment, used in Serrano and Vohra (2005). The reader is referred to
that paper to find an appraisal of the connections of type diversity with the conditions
of interim value distinguished types (Palfrey and Srivastava (1993, definition 6.3)),
incentive consistency (Duggan (1997)), and with the algorithm behind measurability
due to A&M (1992b). As discussed below, the condition is especially compelling in
finite environments, although its definition does not rely on finite sets of first-order
types.
There is a tight connection between ∆-TD and the measurability algorithm. In
∆-TD we have defined a vector Vi(ti) of agent i’s valuations of each alternative ak.
When the algorithm that determines Ψ∗ does not stop in the first step, we need to
consider a more complicated “version” of ak, that we define below. Let F denote the
set of all SCFs. Define
F = {h ∈ F| h(θ) is a degenerate lottery for all θ ∈ Θ} .
Recall that Θ and A are finite. Then, F becomes a finite functional space. Define
also
F (Ψ) = {h ∈ F | h is measurable with respect to Ψ} .
Let |F (Ti × Ψ−i)| = K.16 Define V ki (ti; Ψ−i) to be the interim expected utility of
agent i of first-order type ti = (θi, qi) for each SCF f
k ∈ F (Ti ×Ψ−i), i.e.,
V ki (ti; Ψ−i) =
∑
θ−i∈Θ−i
qi(θ−i)ui(fk(θi, θ−i); θi, θ−i).
Let Vi(ti; Ψ−i) = (V 1i (ti; Ψ−i), . . . , V
K
i (ti; Ψ−i)).
The next lemma follows simply from the definitions of F (Ψ) and of equivalent
first-order types. Its proof is omitted:
Lemma 1 Let ti = (θi, qi), t
′
i = (θ
′
i, q
′
i) ∈ Ti with θi 6= θ′i. Then, ti is equivalent to t′i
(ti ∼ t′i) with respect to Ψ−i if and only if there exist β > 0 and γ ∈ R such that
Vi(ti; Ψ−i) = βVi(t′i; Ψ−i) + γe,
where e is the unit vector in RK.
The following is a characterization of ∆-TD in terms of the measurability con-
struction:
Corollary 1 An environment E satisfies ∆-TD if and only if there do not exist
i ∈ N and ti = (θi, qi), t′i = (θ′i, q′i) ∈ Ti with θi 6= θ′i such that ti is equivalent to t′i
(ti ∼ t′i) with respect to Ψ0−i. It follows that Ψ1i = Ti\ ∼ for each agent i ∈ N , and
Ψ∗ = T\ ∼, where each Ti\ ∼ and T\ ∼ denotes a quotient space generated by the
equivalence relation ∼.
16This is a slight abuse of notation, since K was defined in previous sections as the finite number
of alternatives in the set A. This should not cause any confusion.
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In light of Corollary 1, one can make the following useful observation (see Serrano
and Vohra (2005) for a similar assertion concerning their type diversity):
Lemma 2 (∆-TD ⇒ ∆-measurability) Suppose an environment E satisfies ∆-
TD. Then, every SCF satisfies ∆-measurability.
That is, if the environment satisfies ∆-TD, the algorithm that separates payoff
types in the definition of measurability arrives at the finest partition in the first
round.
4 The Relationship with the Case of Unrestricted
First-Order Types
B&M (2009) study RVI without specifying first-order type spaces as part of the
common knowledge structure in the environment. Under an economic assumption
on the domain, they characterize RVI by means of ex post incentive compatibility
and robust measurability. Robust measurability amounts to A&M measurability in
every type space, and B&M (2009) assess it as a very demanding condition, which
leads them to conclude that the limitations to RVI are severe. This section elaborates
on this assessment, and in doing so, compares their results to ours. We shall organize
it in three subsections: the first two are based on an example and the third discusses
genericity issues more generally.
4.1 An Example under ∆-type diversity
We find it useful to adopt the example from Section 3 in B&M (2009). It describes
the classic problem of allocating one unit of an indivisible good. Most importantly,
it will help underscore the differences between the two papers.
Let the set of payoff types be a finite subset of [0, 1]. For simplicity, let us consider
the case in which there are only two payoff types for each agent, θi = 0 and θi = 1. If
agent i receives the object, his ex post valuation for it is θi + γ
∑
j 6=i θj. Here, γ ≥ 0
is the interdependence parameter.
Our focus is on SCFs that allocate the object efficiently, that is, to the agent with
the highest ex post valuation. It can be shown that when γ > 1, even the standard
interim incentive compatibility condition cannot be met by any such SCF. Thus,
exact and virtual implementation of this important class of SCFs are impossible in
this case.
Suppose then that γ ≤ 1. B&M (2009) show that RVI is possible in this example
if there is not too much interdependence in preferences across agents (specifically,
when γ < 1/(n−1)). For this case, B&M (2009) construct a direct mechanism where
truth-telling is the unique rationalizable action, and hence the desired outcome is
robustly virtually implementable (the mechanism implements the desired allocation
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with arbitrarily high probability and the winner pays the “pivotal” price, whereas a
random allocation is implemented with the rest of probability).17
On the other hand, B&M (2009) show that RVI is impossible, also in the inter-
mediate range of γ’s (1/(n − 1) ≤ γ ≤ 1), this time because of a failure of robust
measurability. In trying to understand the “size” of this failure, we shall show that,
under some standard assumptions, for almost every specification of the set of first-
order beliefs Qi, the necessary conditions for RVI (i.e., ∆-incentive compatibility and
∆-measurability) are very permissive in the example, thanks to the ∆-TD condition.
We proceed to details.
For simplicity in the writing of expressions below, let n = 3. Suppose that the
first-order types for each agent are independent.18 Recall that there are two payoff
types for each agent (0 and 1) and that we are interested in SCFs that allocate the
good efficiently. The specific SCF we consider allocates the good to that agent who
announces the highest payoff type (in the event of a tie, the object is allocated at
random among the highest announcements, using equal probabilities). To calculate
the prices at which the good will be sold, denote by pk the price that corresponds
to k = 0, 1, 2, 3 announcements of the high type θi = 1. Denote by q (resp., q
′) the
probability that agent i of payoff type θi = 0 (resp., θi = 1) believes that agent j is
of the low payoff type.
Then, the incentive compatibility constraint for payoff type θi = 0 is
q2(1/3)(−p0) ≥ q2(−p1) + q(1− q)(γ − p2) + (1− q)2(2γ − p3),
and the one for θi = 1 is
q
′2(1− p1) + q′(1− q′)(1 + γ − p2) + (1− q′)2(1/3)(1 + 2γ − p3) ≥ q′2(1/3)(1− p0).
So, for example, if one adopts a pricing rule so that p0 = p1 = 0, p2 = γ
and p3 = 2γ, these constraints are met for all values of q and q
′. Thus, the ex
post efficient allocation of the object, together with these prices, satisfies ex post
incentive compatibility, and therefore, it also satisfies ∆-incentive compatibility for
any specification of the Qi’s.
Next, we turn our attention to ∆-TD. First, we claim that for 1/2 > γ > 0,
the environment satisfies ∆-TD. Given our pricing rule, there are nine constant
alternatives of relevance:
• a1: the object is allocated to agent 1 for a price of 0;
• a2: the object is allocated to agent 1 for a price of γ;
17Also when γ < 1/(n − 1), Chung and Ely (2001) had earlier shown that truth-telling is the
unique strategy surviving iterative deletion of weakly dominated strategies in the direct mechanism
that uses only the pivotal price.
18This independence assumption is made also for the sake of simplicity. Essentially the same
argument will go through even if there is correlation. The result for a fully general case of correlated
first-order beliefs is available upon request.
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• a3: the object is allocated to agent 1 for a price of 2γ;
• ak, k = 4, . . . , 9: the object is allocated to either agent 2 or 3 for each of the
three prices.
Therefore, the last six entries in each nine-dimensional vector for agent 1’s interim
expected utility are all zeros. We write these vectors of interim expected utility for
the first-order types of agent 1 (the ones for agents 2 and 3 are similar, but alter the
location of the zero components):
V1(0, q) = (2γ(1− q), 2γ(1− q)− γ, 2γ(1− q)− 2γ, 0, . . . , 0)
V1(1, q
′) = (1 + 2γ(1− q′), 1 + 2γ(1− q′)− γ, 1 + 2γ(1− q′)− 2γ, 0, . . . , 0)
When γ ∈ (0, 1/2), it can be easily checked that none of these vectors are positive
affine transformations of one another. Thus, ∆-TD always holds in this case, no
matter what sets Qi of first-order beliefs are picked. This strong separation of first-
order types helps to explain the permissive result in B&M (2009).
In contrast, suppose now that 1 ≥ γ ≥ 1/2.19 For this case, the claim in B&M
(2009) is that RVI in their sense is impossible. Let us explain why. Of course, our
SCF of interest still satisfies ex post incentive compatibility. The failure identified
in B&M (2009) concerns their robust measurability condition. For us, note that the
vectors of interim expected utility written above still apply. In particular, two first-
order types with a different payoff type could have positive affine collinear vectors
only when
q′ − q = 1
2γ
.
Therefore, if the set of first-order beliefs Qi excludes these first-order belief pairs,
the environment satisfies ∆-TD, and every SCF satisfies ∆-measurability. It follows
that the failure of robust measurability is due only to the presence of such “non-
generic” pairs of first-order types. That is, even in a model with a continuum of
first-order types, violations of ∆-TD are restricted to a set of measure 0, and thus
a robust version of measurability is a trivial condition, satisfied by all SCFs, if one
imposes it over a full measure set of first-order beliefs. Subsection 4.3 and Appendix
A elaborate on this.
Having said that, in conjunction with other standard conditions, such as convexity
of the set of first-order beliefs, ∆-TD imposes strong separation requirements, as it
implies that the lowest value q′ for the interval of first-order beliefs accompanying
payoff type 1 must be at a distance from the highest value q of the allowed first-order
belief for payoff type 0 of at least 1/(2γ), implying something akin to the “belief-
determined-preferences” assumption that Neeman (2004) rightly criticizes. In this
19Recall that for ease of presentation, we are writing our expressions for n = 3. The general
condition here is 1 ≥ γ ≥ 1/(n − 1). A similar comment applies to the previous paragraph, for
which the general condition is γ ∈ (0, 1/(n− 1)).
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sense, while ∆-TD is still generic in continuum settings, it is much less appealing in
some of them.
4.2 The Example beyond ∆-type diversity
In this subsection we address what happens in the example in environments that do
not satisfy ∆-TD. Again, to simplify our expressions, suppose that n = 3. Then, the
relevant range for γ is [1/2, 1]. For an environment to violate ∆-TD, recall that, for
at least one pair of first-order types present in the model, q′ − q = 1/(2γ), where q
(q′) represents the probability that an agent of payoff type θi = 0 (θi = 1) believes
another agent to be of the low payoff type.
We claim that even these “non-generic” pairs of first-order types may, under some
assumptions, be separated if one goes only one step further in the measurability
algorithm. First, suppose that there is an agent j whose payoff types are fully
separated in the first round of the algorithm (that is, Qj does not contain q, q
′ such
that q′ − q = 1/(2γ)). We will show that all payoff types of an agent i 6= j can be
separated in the second round of the algorithm.
Consider a pair of first-order types of agent i, (0, q) and (1, q′), such that q′− q =
1/(2γ). These types cannot be separated by using constant SCFs, as they have the
same interim preferences over that class. However, if we allow SCFs to depend on
reports of agent j 6= i, these two types can be separated. Let xi be an SCF that
gives the object to agent i for free with probability 1/2 if θi = 0, θj = 1; with the rest
of probability and in all other cases it gives the object to k 6= i, j. Similarly, yi gives
the object for free to agent i if θi = 1, θj = 0; in all other cases it gives the object
to k 6= i, j. Note that these SCFs satisfy ∆-measurability, because Θj is partitioned
in all singletons after the first round of the measurability algorithm. To show that
first-order type (0, q) prefers xi to yi and (1, q
′) prefers yi to xi, we compute interim
utilities of these two types:
Vi(xi|(0, q)) = 1/2(1− q)[(1− q)× 2γ + q × γ]
Vi(yi; (1, q
′)|(0, q)) = q(1− q)γ.
Vi(yi|(1, q′)) = q′[(1− q′)(1 + γ) + q′]
Vi(xi; (0, q)|(1, q′)) = 1/2(1− q′)[(1− q′)(1 + 2γ) + q′(1 + γ)].
Note that, as q′−q = 1/(2γ) and γ ∈ [1/2, 1], it follows that q′ ≥ 1/2 ≥ 1−q′ and
q ≤ 1/2 ≤ 1− q. Then (0, q) prefers xi to yi because (1− q)γ + 1/2× qγ > (1− q)γ,
while (1, q′) prefers yi to xi because (1−q′)(1+γ)+q′ > (1−q′)(1/2+γ)+q′×(1+γ)/2.
Thus, these two first-order types would self-reveal themselves if offered the choice
between xi and yi.
Note that xi and yi separate any pair of first-order types (0, q) and (1, q
′
) such
that q′ − q = 1/(2γ). Therefore, as long as there exists an agent (such as j) whose
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finest partition is reached in the first round of the algorithm, all payoff types of every
other agent can be separated in the second round of the algorithm. In that case, the
final partition of the measurability algorithm is the finest partition of all singletons
in Θi for every agent i, even for γ ∈ [1/2, 1]. Therefore, RVI is not restricted at
all by ∆-measurability, which becomes a trivial condition in our model: every SCF
satisfies it.
We have shown above how to construct SCFs that separate first-order types (0, q)
and (1, q′); let us now demonstrate how we construct SCFs that separate all first-
order types of agent i. For agent i, one can construct a collection of constant SCFs
x1i ∈ {`i(ti)}ti to separate the different classes of equivalent first-order types in the
first iteration of the measurability algorithm. Further, one can find x2i ∈ {xi, yi} to
separate the first-order types that form non-singleton atoms of the partition in Θ.
Then, an SCF that is measurable with respect to Ti×Ψ1−i, essentially (1−δ)x1i +δx2i
that, for δ > 0 small enough, will separate all first-order types: because of the strict
inequalities on the x1i , the first-order types that are separated in the first iteration
of the algorithm stick to truth-telling for small enough δ. For the rest, each pair of
first-order types that form an atom in the partition have identical preferences over
constant SCFs (x1i are constant – each such first-order type will choose their most
preferred SCF from this set of functions). These types are separated by the x2i , as
shown in the above argument.
Let us now turn to the case where Qi of every agent i has first-order beliefs
q′ − q = 1/(2γ). In that case, the measurability algorithm stops in the first round
and separation is impossible. ∆-measurability would then require that SCFs to
be implemented must be constant across (0, q) and (1, q′). As the SCF depends
only on payoff types, this implies that only constant SCFs are robustly virtually
implementable.
The reason for this lack of separation is easy to see. We do not impose any
restrictions on second-order beliefs in the paper. In particular, these “non-generic”
first-order type pairs (0, q), (1, q′) of agent i may believe that first-order types of
agents j, k are always either (0, ql) or (1, q
′
l) with q
′
l− ql = 1/(2γ), for l = j, k.20 Such
a belief does not violate any assumptions on the environment, as long as agent i of
type (0, q) ((1, q′)) believes agent j or k is (0, q) with probability q (q′). The pairs
(0, q), (1, q′) are not separable in the first round of the algorithm and form elements
ψj ∈ Ψ1j and ψk ∈ Ψ1k of partitions of Tj, Tk.
SCFs that separate (0, q), (1, q′) need to be measurable with respect to the par-
titions Ψ1j × Ψ1k. It then implies that separating SCFs in the second round of the
algorithm are constant on {ψj, ψk}. As agent i assigns probability 1 on first-order
types of j, k 6= i being in ψj, ψk, a variation of SCFs outside of {ψj, ψk} is irrelevant.
Thus, (0, q), (1, q′) would need to be separated by constant SCFs, but this is impos-
sible as these types were not separated in the first round. Hence, if second-order
beliefs are unrestricted, RVI is very limited. It can be shown that, by imposing some
20For notational simplicity, we shall use below the same values of q, q′ for agents i, j, k.
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restrictions on the second-order beliefs, such limitations can be removed. We shall
skip the details, as such restrictions on second-order beliefs are foreign to the paper.
4.3 Genericity of ∆-type diversity
In this subsection we abandon the example and make a more general point. The
result in B&M (2009) can be understood as uncovering robust measurability as an
additional restriction for RVI beyond ex post incentive compatibility. Recall that,
given a class of environments indexed by different type spaces, robust measurability
amounts to A&M measurability on every type space in the class. We shall provide
here an argument of genericity of the ∆-TD assumption when the sets Qi are finite.
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Recall that A is a finite set consisting of K alternatives, and recall our definition of
the first-order interim utility Vi(ti) = (V
k
i (ti))k=1,...,K . Let K ≥ 3 for this subsection
(if K = 2, a violation of ∆-TD happens when ordinal preferences are the same across
types, a property that is certainly preserved for small perturbations).
Let Vi : Θi × ∆(Θ−i) → RK be an agent i’s first-order expected utilities over
all constant SCFs. For each first-order type ti = (θi, qi), assume there exist two
alternatives ak, ak′ ∈ A such that V ki (ti) < V k
′
i (ti), and choosing one such pair of
alternatives with extreme values, normalize expected utilities so that V ki (θi, qi) = 0,
V k
′
i (θi, qi) = 1, and Vi(θi, qi) ∈ [0, 1]K .
Let |Ti| denote the cardinality of the set of first-order types for agent i. Call
S =
∑
i∈N |Ti|. With this notation, one can associate a normalized environment E
with a point on Ω, the unit cube in R(K−2)S with vertices at the points (0, . . . , 0)
and (1, . . . , 1). Endow Ω with the uniform metric, and define open balls using this
metric relative to Ω. Since the property of ∆-TD is defined by a finite number of
inequalities, one can easily see that the set of points in Ω satisfying it is an open and
dense subset of Ω. That is,
• for each environment in Ω that satisfies ∆-TD, there exists an open ball around
it containing only the environments in which the property is maintained, and
• for each environment in Ω that violates ∆-TD and for each open ball around
it, there always exists an environment satisfying ∆-TD in that ball.
Suppose therefore that the planner does not know which payoff types or first-
order types will be chosen by nature, i.e., which point in Ω will be chosen, and
suppose she can specify an ex-ante probability measure over such nature choices.
The assumption that she can confine herself to Ω uses the innocuous normalization
of expected utilities and assumes further that she knows that she will be dealing only
with “finite worlds,” a finite number of payoff types for each agent and a finite set
of possible first-order beliefs (perhaps due to complexity issues, in specifying payoffs
21A similar genericity argument can be provided for the infinite case; see Appendix A and also
Kunimoto and Serrano (2010).
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and probabilities, agents stop after a finite number of decimals). It then follows from
our Theorem 3 below and from the afore discussion that she will be able to robustly
virtually implement any ex post incentive compatible SCF with ex-ante probability
1. In this sense, the robust measurability restriction is generically trivial in our
settings.
We remark again that, while the genericity of ∆-TD continues to hold in the
continuum, as the key is to rule out “rare” pairs of first-order types, in conjunction
with other standard assumptions in the continuum, such as convexity of the set of
first-order beliefs, ∆-TD may imply a strong association of payoff types and first-
order beliefs. Nonetheless, if in the unrestricted continuum model, the planner is
forced to sample at most a finite number of first-order beliefs, our finite model analysis
applies, in which ∆-TD is much more compelling.
5 Sufficiency for Robust Virtual Implementation
So far, we have focused on necessary conditions for RVI. In the process, we have
identified ∆-incentive compatibility and ∆-measurability as relevant conditions. In
the previous section, we have argued that ∆-measurability is generically a trivial
condition. In this section we will establish sufficiency results for RVI. Our proof
is an extension to our environment of the corresponding proof in A&M (1992b).
Both follow the same sequence of arguments; therefore we omit all formal details,
which can be found in the online appendix to our paper. Instead, we outline the
general proof technique. The argument for the environment where ∆-TD is satisfied
is simple and a straightforward extension of the A&M mechanism and also borrows
from Serrano and Vohra (2005). The proof for the general environment builds upon
that simpler first argument. We present both arguments in sequence.
To establish our sufficiency results, we introduce two new assumptions. First,
we assume that the set of first-order beliefs for every agent is finite. Second, we
introduce the following assumption on environments:
Definition 9 (Quasi-Transferability) An environment E satisfies quasi-transfer-
ability if there exists a collection of lotteries {a¯i}i∈N and {ai}i∈N in ∆(A) such that
for any θ ∈ Θ,
1. ui(a¯i; θ) > ui(ai; θ) for any i ∈ N ;
2. ui(ai′ ; θ) ≥ ui(a¯i′ ; θ) for any i, i′ ∈ N with i 6= i′.
Remark: This is an exact analogue of A&M’s (1992b) Assumption 2. This assump-
tion allows the agents to (partially) transfer their utilities among them. By making
this assumption, we essentially postulate that A includes a numeraire, which can be
transferred across agents. Moreover, this assumption cannot be completely dispensed
with as long as we seek for implementation by finite mechanisms (see Kunimoto and
Serrano (2011)).
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To avoid unnecessary details, we will assume that f satisfies strict ∆-incentive
compatibility (this assumption is not made in the online appendix). For the suffi-
ciency argument, we construct a mechanism Γ = (M, g), where M = ×i∈NMi,
Mi = M
0
i ×M1i × · · · ×MJi = Ti × Ti × · · · × Ti︸ ︷︷ ︸
J+1
,
that is, each agent reports her first-order type J+1 times, and the outcome function
g(·) consists of the following parts (this is exactly how A&M’s (1992b) mechanism
can also be described): for any m ∈M ,
g(m) = ε× separation function(m0)
+ ε2 × punishment function(m0, . . . ,mJ)
+ (1− ε− ε2)× 1
J
J∑
j=1
f(θˆ(mj))
where θˆ(mj) ∈ Θ denotes the payoff type component of mj. The separation function,
which only depends on the first report m0, allows to distinguish different first-order
types of each player. We can think of it as a menu of SCFs (lotteries in environments
satisfying ∆-TD) such that an agent who has two first-order types with distinct payoff
types will always select two different SCFs from the menu. Hence, if there were no
other components, we would have had the truthful revelation of payoff types. Yet,
as our goal is not to separate agents’ payoff types, but to implement the SCF f , we
add the two other components.
First observe that in quasi-transferable environments, for any η > 0, it is possible
to construct two lotteries a¯i[η] and ai[η] so that for every agent i ∈ N and θ ∈ Θ,
0 < ui(a¯i[η]; θ) − ui(ai[η]; θ) ≤ η (the full formal details of this claim as well as
the relevant discussion are provided in the online appendix). The second component
punishes the agent for the inconsistency between her first report m0 and a subsequent
report (m1, . . . ,mJ); the punishment is only applied to the agent with the earliest
inconsistent report. In that case only, any such agent i receives a lottery ai[η] from
the punishment component and all other agents i receive a lottery a¯i[η]. Since η > 0
can be chosen arbitrarily small, the size of the punishment can also be made very
small. This is the way we construct the punishment function. This punishment alone
could have changed the incentives of the agents to report truthfully in the separation
component, but our weighting of these two components (ε and ε2, respectively) guar-
antees that the incentives are preserved: the agent has higher utility from reporting
truthfully in m0 and taking the punishment than from changing m0.
The last term is the SCF f that the planner wants to implement, which is split into
J identical pieces (thus it depends on m1, . . . ,mJ messages). Consider one such piece
f(mj). Assume that all agents report truthfully all the way to the (j− 1)th message
(m1, . . . ,mj−1) (this is our induction hypothesis). If all agents report truthfully at
mj, strict ∆-incentive compatibility guarantees that any deviation from truth-telling
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is strictly worse for any agent. On the other hand, if agent i
′
deviates at the jth
report mj, some agent i (possibly i = i
′
) may obtain a better outcome from this
piece of f by deviating as well. By doing so, agent i will not only receive a better
outcome, but also a punishment. The assumption of quasi-transferability is used in
the punishment component, which allows to punish the deviator without inflicting
“excessive” damage on the other agents.22 Therefore, choosing a large J guarantees
that punishment is costlier than the benefit from the deviation in the j-th small piece
of f .
This mechanism is a close adaptation of the A&M (1992b) mechanism and the
arguments are parallel to the ones thereof. However, our analysis also exhibits some
differences. Our solution concept is different, because of our restrictions on first-
order beliefs. Our mechanism does not necessarily isolate a unique ∆-rationalizable
strategy profile yet implementation is successful since the SCF f only depends on
payoff types and the misrepresentation of qi into q
′
i with the same payoff type θi is
of no significance.
While the proof under ∆-TD is essentially identical to the proof in A&M (Section
3, 1992b), the mechanism under ∆-TD is very transparent and serves as a useful
springboard to our further adaptation of the mechanism to the general environment.
We only state the result here and make an argument required to apply A&M’s proof.
Those readers interested in the formal proof are referred to the online appendix.
Theorem 3 Suppose an environment E satisfies ∆-TD, quasi-transferability, and
that Qi is finite for every i ∈ N . If an SCF f satisfies ∆-incentive compatibility, it
is robustly virtually implementable.
Under ∆-TD, following the arguments in Lemma 1 of Serrano and Vohra (2005),
we identify, for each i ∈ N , the family of lotteries {`i(θi, qi)}. If an agent i of first-
order type (θi, qi) were asked to choose the most preferred lottery out of that set, each
will uniquely choose the corresponding `i(θi, qi). These lotteries form the separation
component of g(m). The formal argument for the construction of these lotteries can
be found in the online appendix. Note that these lotteries do not depend on the
other agents’ messages. Also, the menu of these lotteries separates all first-order
types. Since all we need is to separate payoff types, multiplicity of ∆-rationalizable
strategies in the mechanism is possible, where misrepresentations of the first-order
belief may happen.
The proof for the general case that does not require ∆-TD has three key differ-
ences. First, each agent i’s message space M ji becomes the partition of Ti, which is
the finest partition generated by the measurability algorithm. Second, the separa-
tion function is a weighted sum of subcomponents constructed separately for each
iteration of the same measurability algorithm. Third, to prove that the mechanism
we construct indeed virtually implements an SCF f , we use double mathematical
22More specifically, quasi-transferability guarantees that for any i, i
′ ∈ N with i 6= i′ and θ ∈ Θ,
ui(ai′ [η]; θ) ≥ ui(a¯i′ [η]; θ).
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induction, both on the message components (as in Section 3 of A&M (1992b) and as
in our previous step) and on the steps of the measurability algorithm.
In the general environment, we need to rely on the messages of other players when
we construct a separating function for agent i. Our construction of the separating
function mirrors the steps of the measurability algorithm, which achieves further
separation in step h by using “intermediate” separation in step h − 1. Hence, the
separating function is:
separation function(m0) =
1
n
∑
i∈N
(
1
1 + δ + δ2 + · · ·+ δL
L∑
h=0
δhxhi [Ψ
h
i (m
0
i )](θˆ(m
0))
)
where δ > 0 and a function xhi [Ψ
h
i (m
0
i )] : Θ 7→ ∆(A) is an SCF that separates first-
order types of agent i given the separation that has already been achieved (hence the
index [Ψhi (m
0
i )]). Note also the increasing weights for each component; the choice
of small δ guarantees that further separation does not interfere with the separation
achieved in the earlier steps. This is formalized in the following claim, Claim 4.1
from the online appendix:
Claim 4.1: Suppose that m ∈ SΓ˜(θ). Then, for any i ∈ N and h = 0, 1, . . . , L, we
have m0i ⊆ Ψhi (θi, qi) for some qi ∈ Qi. In other words, m0i = Ψ∗i (θi, qi) with some
qi ∈ Qi.
The other two components of the outcome function are as in A&M (1992b) and
as in our previous step. The previous claim is key in establishing the following
characterization:
Theorem 4 (A Characterization of RVI) Suppose an environment E satisfies
quasi-transferability and that the sets Qi are finite. An SCF f is robustly vir-
tually implementable if and only if it satisfies ∆-incentive compatibility and ∆-
measurability.
Remark: If the sets Qi are not finite, an adaptation of the maximally revealing
mechanism of B&M (2009) to the appropriately restricted notion of measurability
would provide the proof of Theorem 4 for this case. In particular, we can use the
adapted maximally revealing mechanism as the separation component of g(m) and
M ji is set as the partition over Ti generated by the appropriately restricted measur-
ability algorithm. We choose to present the proof based on finite Qi’s as a way to
illustrate how the argument must be built up from our Theorem 3, our result based
on ∆-TD. Of course, the general characterization of RVI so obtained, by means of
∆-incentive compatibility and ∆-measurability for any arbitrary collection of sets
Qi, boils down to the characterization theorem in B&M (2009), in terms of ex post
incentive compatibility and robust measurability, when the set of first-order beliefs
is unrestricted, i.e., Qi = ∆(Θ−i) for every i ∈ N .
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6 Conclusion
By proposing a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine – the planner can rely on
restrictions on first-order beliefs, which can be made common knowledge in addition
to payoff types – we have shown that RVI is often as powerful as it can possibly be.
Indeed, with ∆-type diversity, the limits of implementation are given by ∆-incentive
compatibility, but every ∆-incentive compatible SCF can be robustly virtually im-
plemented. Thus, even if one insists on robustness of implementation results, there
is a gap between the results offered by exact implementation and those offered by
the virtual approach. For both, the main restriction is the appropriate kind of in-
centive compatibility. Both are subject to it, so when many types are present in the
model, “interim” incentive compatibility may become quite restrictive, although one
can find environments (see the example in Subsections 4.1 and 4.2) in which even
ex post incentive compatibility is still permissive. The real difference, though, stems
from the extra conditions that tackle the “multiplicity of equilibrium” problem, key
to full implementation. While robust monotonicity (B&M (2011)) is often quite lim-
iting, we have argued that a robust version of measurability is not. Indeed, in our
settings, ∆-measurability – A&M measurability over the allowed type spaces – is a
trivial condition if it is imposed over almost every type space.
Appendix A: Genericity of ∆-TD in Continuum
Settings
We extend here our argument on the genericity of ∆-TD in Section 4.3 to some
settings in the continuum. Without loss of generality, we focus only on agent i
throughout. We denote by ∆0(Θ−i) the interior of ∆(Θ−i).
Our quasi-transferability assumption guarantees the following no total indiffer-
ence condition: for each i ∈ N and each first-order type ti = (θi, qi), there exist two
outcomes ak, ak′ ∈ A such that V ki (θi, qi) 6= V k′i (θi, qi). We also make the following
assumption:
Definition 10 (Ex Post Type Diversity) A payoff environment E∆ = (A,Θi, ui)i∈N
satisfies ex post type diversity if, for every i ∈ N , every θi, θ′i ∈ Θi with θi 6= θ′i,
there exist a ∈ A and θ−i ∈ Θ−i such that ui(a; θi, θ−i) 6= ui(a; θ′i, θ−i).
Remark: Note that this assumption is significantly weak in the sense that when
|A| ≥ 3, it is generically a vacuous condition due to the finiteness of Θ. See also
Section 4.3 for the argument.
We are now ready to state the main result of this section that shows ∆-TD
generically holds in the continuum setups.
Theorem 5 Suppose that the payoff environment E∆ = (A,Θi, ui)i∈N satisfies ex
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post type diversity and no total indifference. Then, for every i ∈ N , there exists a
residual subset in ∆0(Θ−i) for which ∆-TD holds.23
Proof : Fix (θ`, θm) with θ` 6= θm. Taking into account the no-total-indifference
condition, we define
B(`,m)(qi) = {q′i ∈ ∆0(Θ−i)|Vi(θ`i , qi) = Vi(θmi , q
′
i)}.
Then, we claim the following:
Claim A: For any θ`i , θ
m
i ∈ Θi with θ`i 6= θmi and any qi ∈ ∆0(Θ−i), B(`,m)(qi) is
either empty or a countable union of isolated points in ∆0(Θ−i).
Proof of Claim A: Suppose, on the contrary, that there exists q
′
i ∈ B(`,m)(qi)
such that for any neighborhood V of q
′
i in ∆
0(Θ−i) such that V \{q′i}∩B(`,m)(qi) 6= ∅.
Ex post type diversity allows us to choose a neighborhood V of q
′
i such that for any
qi ∈ V , Vi(θ`i , qi) 6= Vi(θmi , qi ). This implies that V \{q′i} ∩ B(`,m)(qi) = ∅, which is
a contradiction. The reason why B(`,m)(qi) is at most a countable union of isolated
points is that ∆0(Θ−i) is a separable metric space and contains a countable dense
subset in it.
Assume that B(`,m)(qi) is nonempty. Then, it is a closed set so that the closure
of B(`,m)(qi) is the same as B(`,m)(qi). However, B(`,m)(qi) has no interior points in
it. Therefore, B(`,m)(qi) is nowhere dense.
Since ∆0(Θ−i) is a separable metric space, it contains a countable dense subset
in it. We define {qλi }∞λ=1 as such a countable dense subset in ∆0(Θ−i). Define
B ≡
⋃
`,m:`6=m
∞⋃
λ=1
B(`,m)(q
λ
i ).
Since countable unions of countable sets are countable, the above set B is a countable
union of nowhere dense sets, i.e., a meager set. Once again, since ∆0(Θ−i) is a
separable metric space and it contains a countable dense subset in it, this set B
characterizes the set of all first-order beliefs such that ∆-TD is violated. Thus, the
complement of this set is
∆∗ ≡ ∆0(Θ−i)\B,
which characterizes the set of all first-order beliefs in ∆0(Θ−i) such that ∆-TD holds.
Thus, this set ∆∗ is a residual set in ∆0(Θ−i). This completes the proof.
23A set is meager if it contains a countable union of nowhere dense sets. The complement of a
meager set is called a residual set. A residual set is a usual topological notion of a generic set.
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